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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of : 
TOWN OF HUNTINGTON, : 
Employer, : BOARD DECISION 
-and- : AND ORDER 
LOCAL 342, LONG ISLAND PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES, : 
Petitioner, : Case No. C-1393 
-and- : 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., SUFFOLK : 
COUNTY CHAPTER, 
Intervenor. 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Town of Huntington, 
the employer herein, from a decision of the Director of Public Employment 
Practices and Representation designating a negotiating unit of blue-collar 
supervisory employees. That unit comprises 53 foremen who had previously 
been in a comprehensive unit of blue-collar employees and one presently un-
represented employee, the beach manager.— The comprehensive blue-collar 
unit is represented by Local 342, Long Island Public Service Employees, 
which is also the petitioner herein. 
— The petition sought a unit of supervisors which would also have included 
white collar supervisory employees who are in a comprehensive white collar 
unit that is represented by CSEA. There have been no exceptions filed by 
any party to that part of the Director's decision that excluded white-
collar supervisors from the unit of blue-collar supervisory employees, and 
on this record, we agree with his determination. 
C-1393 -2 
The employer contends that the trial examiner erred in admitting hear-
say evidence and conclusory statements by witnesses. It argues that the 
Director erred in not dismissing the petition because petitioner did not 
first request recognition from it in accordance with Section 201.3(a) of our 
Rules and because the. petition was not supported by a showing of interest. 
The employer also alleges that the Director's decision was against the weight 
of the evidence which assertedly establishes not only that there is no inher-
ent conflict of interest between supervisory blue-collar employees and rank-
and-file blue-collar employees but also that a separate unit of supervisory 
employees would impair its ability to serve its constituency. In addition, 
the employer argues that the petitioner is foreclosed from claiming a conflict 
of interest for the reasonr. that it deliberately created such conflict by its 
failure fairly to represent its total unit constituency. Other exceptions 
of the employer are that the supervisors' unit as defined by the Director 
includes titles that were not specified in the petition and that the Director 
erred in saying that it did not object to including the beach manager in the 
supervisors' unit. 
For the reasons stated below, we affirm the determination of the Direc-
tor that there should be a negotiating unit of blue-collar supervisors. 
The hearing officer committed no error in his admission of evidence. 
It is well established that " [Administrative hearings are not limited to 
strict court rules in the reception of evidence . . .",(Schadt v. Sardino, 
48 A.D.2d 171, 174 [1975]). "[H]earsay testimony is not barred,. . . [but] 
it is required that there be a 'residual' of competent evidence of probative 
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force so substantial as to support the determination of the agency." (Shields 
v. Hults, 21 A.D.2d 745, 746 [1964]). In the instant proceeding, we find that 
there is sufficient competent and probative evidence to support the Director's 
conclusion that the performance by the supervisors of their duties and respon-
sibilities, particularly in the area of discipline, has engendered a conflict 
between the interests of supervisory and rank-and-file employees which adverse-
ly affects the interests of the supervisors in the representation afforded 
them in the existing unit. There is no evidence to support the employer's 
assertion that such conflict is essentially without substance but was deliber-
ately made to appear otherwise by the petitioner. Finally, there is no-.basis? 
in the evidence for a finding that a separate unit of blue-collar supervisory 
employees would impair the employer's ability to perform its governmental 
functions. Accordingly, we affirm the Director's conclusion that the employer' 
bare claim of administrative convenience cannot serve to defeat petitioner's 
request, which is validly based upon a demonstrated essential conflict 
between the role of the blue-collar supervisors in their capacity as supervi-
sors and .their concerns as members of the same unit as their subordinates. 
The employer's exception directed to the showing of interest to support 
the petition is rejected on the ground that the Director's determination is 
not reviewable (§201.4 of our Rules of Procedure and Board of Education of the 
City of Yonkers, 10 PERB 1[3100 [1977]). 
We also find no merit in the contention that the petition was defective 
because petitioner did not first request recognition from the employer before 
filing its petition. Section 201.3(a) of our Rules, which is the basis for 




where the employees involved have not been previously represented and seek 
such representation for the first time. Where, as in the situation here, the 
petition is for employees who are already represented in an existing unit, 
there is no requirement of a prior request for recognition (Section 201.3[d] 
of our Rules). 
The Director did not err by defining a supervisory unit that included 
titles not specified in the original petition. He was not "limited...to 
approving or disapproving units proposed by the parties to the dispute." (CSEA 
2] 
v. Helsby, 32 A.D.2d 131, 134 [1969], affirmed 25 N.Y.2d 842 [1969]). By the 
same token, whether or not the employer objected to the inclusion of the beach 
manager in the supervisors' unit is also irrelevant, as the evidence estab-
3] 
lishes the appropriateness of his placement there. 
NOW THEREFORE WE ORDER that there shall be a unit of employees of the 
employer as follows: 
INCLUDED: Labor foremen I, II and III, auto mechanic foremen 
II and III, incinerator plant foremen, sanitation 
site foremen, golf course manager, grounds maintenance 
foremen, senior bay constable, senior dog warden, 
senior sewerage plant operator, refuse manager and 
beach manager. 
EXCLUDED: All other employees. 
2] Moreover, the petition was amended at the hearing to include all but one 
of the titles included in the unit. 
3] At all times the employer objected to the creation of any unit of super-
visors. It did, however, submit a "Statement of Alternative Position", 
which specified certain job titles that it deemed to be supervisory and, 
therefore, the only ones possibly appropriate for inclusion in a separate 
supervisors' unit. Beach manager was one of those titles. 
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FURTHER IT IS ORDERED that an election by secret ballot shall be held 
under the Director's supervision among the employees in the unit determined 
above to be appropriate and who were employed by the employer on the payroll 
date immediately preceding the date of this decision, UNLESS the petitioner 
submits to him within ten days from the date of receipt of this decision, 
evidence to satisfy the requirement of §201.9(g) of the Rules for certifica-
tion without an election. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the employer shall submit to the Director 
and petitioner within 10 days from the date of receipt of this decision an 
alphabetized list of all employees within the unit determined above to be 
appropriate who were employed on the payroll date immediately preceding the 
date of this decision. 
Dated, New York, New York 
January 23, 1978 




STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC•EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
MIDDLETOWN POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Respondent, 
-and-
CITY OF MIDDLETOWN, 
Charging Party. 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NO. U-2743 
The charge herein was filed by the City of Middletown (hereinafter the 
City) on June 20, 1977. It alleges that the Middletown Police Benevolent 
Association, Inc. (hereinafter PBA) improperly submitted to interest arbitral 
1 
tion several demands that had been previously resolved during negotiations. 
Specifically, the City contends that all but four of the sixteen demands 
which PBA seeks to arbitrate were withdrawn by PBA during the negotiations 
prior to its request for the assistance of a mediator and the subsequent 
recourse to arbitration. 
This matter has been processed in accordance with §204.4 of our Rules. 
Thus, the hearing officer assigned to conduct the hearing has transmitted the 
record directly to us for determination. 
The witnesses at the hearing were the parties' chief negotiators. 
They were the City Treasurer and the PBA president. While neither witness 
1_ One of the objections to arbitrability enumerated in §205.6(a) of our 
Rules is that "a matter proposed had been resolved by agreement during 
the course of negotiations." 
see 
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had a full recollection of what had occurred during the negotiations, there 
is sufficient evidence to establish the following facts: On November 9, 1976, 
after several negotiating sessions, PBA offered to withdraw twelve of its 
original demands if agreement were reached as to the four remaining demands 
2 
as revised by PBA at the time of its conditional proposal.— At the nego-
tiation sessions that took place thereafter, all discussion was restricted to 
the four demands. No agreement was reached on those demands. Thereafter, 
on February 9, 1977, Parrella, the PBA president, addressed a letter to PERB 
requesting the assistance of a mediator. In that letter, he specified the 
four items as the open issues. When PERB later appointed a factfinder on 
March 30, 1977, the PBA presented all sixteen demands for his consideration. 
Over the City's strong objections that all but four of the demands had been 
withdrawn during the negotiations, the factfinder addressed himself to the 
sixteen items. 
It is clear from the testimony of Parella that it was the parties' 
understanding that, if agreement were reached during the negotiations on the 
four issues in contention, PBA's other demands would have been deemed with-
— The four demands as endorsed by the membership of PBA on November 9, 1976, 
were: 
"That the cleaning allowance be increased from $100.00 to $125.00; 
That the percentage of sick time to.be paid to a member upon re-
tirement be increased to 50%, 180 days maximum; 
That the membership receive a cost of living salary increase for 
each of the two years; 
That members in the detective bureau be given equal compensation 
as patrolmen for their overtime and court time." 
It appears from the.record that the City has agreed to PBA's demand that 
the clearning allowance be increased to $125.00. 
Board - U-2743 _3 
drawn and a complete contract would have resulted. No such agreement had been 
reached when the negotiating dispute was submitted to PERB for arbitration. It 
cannot be said that an award issued in interest arbitration is to be regarded 
as though it were an agreement reached between the parties on all outstanding 
issues. Interest arbitration in police and firefighter disputes is not a part 
of the negotiating process, and its end result, namely, the award, cannot be 
regarded as though it were an agreement arrived at by the parties. It is, 
rather, a substitute for, and similar in effect to, the final determination im-
posed by the legislative body of the particular government for resolving dead-
locks involving other classes of employees after the parties' efforts to reach 
an agreement have failed. In Haver straw, 9 PERB 1(3063 (1967), we stated 
(at p. 3109): 
"Interest arbitration is not, and was not intended as an 
alternative to, or substitute for, good faith negotiations. 
Rather, it is a procedure of last resort in police and fire 
department impasse situations when efforts of the parties 
themselves to reach agreement through true negotiations and 
conciliation procedures have actually been exhausted." 
We conclude that, while the negotiations centered on the four demands, 
the condition for PBA's withdrawal of the twelve demands was not satisfied 
during the negotiation process because the parties had failed to reach agree-
ment on the four demands when the deadlock developed. Hence, the other twelve 
demands remained alive. Accordingly, we find that PBA committed no violation 
of the duty to bargain in good faith when it revived the twelve issues by 
presenting them to the arbitrator. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the charge herein be dismissed. 
DATED: New York, New York 
January 23, 1978 
k, /£& 
wm sfvgf ' Ida Klaus 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NO. U-2583 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Social Service 
Employees Union, Local 371, respondent herein, from a hearing officer's 
decision finding it in violation of §209-a.2(a) of the Taylor Law in that it 
did not accord fair representation to Serge B. Rameau, the charging party, 
when it refused to process a grievance that he submitted to respondent on 
February 15, 1977, and it did not explain to him the reason for the refusal. 
Respondent has also filed a motion, with an accompanying affidavit, for an 
order reopening the record on the asserted ground that it has newly discovered 
evidence directly affecting the finding of the hearing officer. 
The following facts gave rise to the grievance: Mr. Rameau was an 
acting Senior Hospital Care Investigator at Lincoln Hospital. Three permanent 
Senior Hospital Care Investigator positions became available at Lincoln 
Hospital. Two of the positions were filled by persons who ranked higher on 
the eligibility list than Rameau; the third position remained vacant. Rameau's 
grievance protested the employer's refusal to appoint him to the third vacancy. 
McGreen, the respondent's representative for Local 371, refused to sign the 
grievance. Rameau testified that the reason given by McGreen for his refusal 
was that Joseph, respondent's grievance representative, had instructed him 
not to sign any grievance on Rameau's behalf because Rameau was about to 
£=• .p,. f* pn 
In the Matter of 
SOCIAL SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION, LOCAL 371, 
Respondent, 
-and-
SERGE B. RAMEAU, 
Charging Party. 
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testify against other representatives of Local 371 in a proceeding that was 
unrelated to any of the issues in the instant case. McGreen denied receiving 
the written grievance from Rameau or telling him that he had been instructed 
not to sign or process grievances on his behalf. Based on the demeanor of the 
witnesses, the hearing officer credited the testimony of Rameau that he sub-
mitted the grievance and that McGreen refused to sign it or process it for the 
... 1 
reasons stated by Rameau. He concluded: 
"... even if the Local at some later date may have 
determined the grievance to be non-meritorious (footnote 
omitted), it owed a duty to Rameau to either process his 
grievance or respond and explain the basis for its re-
jection. It did neither. This perfunctory, indeed 
arbitrary, conduct which I have found to have been moti-
vated by McGreen and Joseph's hostility toward him is 
violative of §209-a.2(a) of the Act." 
In support of its motion to reopen the hearing, respondent has sub-
mitted affidavits indicating that during February 1977 Rameau contacted Lillian 
Roberts, Associate Director of District Council 37, a superior body of Local 37.] 
and that she did thereafter successfully attempt to obtain for Rameau a per-...•/.?. 
manent promotion to Senior Hospital Care Investigator, which he received in 
June 1977. The implication of the affidavit is that Rameau, in the first 
instance, sought the assistance of the superior body and not that of Local 371 
in presenting and pursuing his grievance and that the superior body did do so. 
Rameau's response negates this implication. He asserts that, in accordance 
with the grievance procedure, he submitted his grievance directly to Local 371 
and not to District Council 37. He indicated that he spoke to Roberts only 
about a human rights action that he had brought against the Local and the 
superior body on January 31, 1977. Without resolving this conflict, we deny 
the motion. The request to submit new evidence after a hearing officer's 
1 On two other issues of fact, the hearing officer resolved the question of 
credibility by crediting testimony of Bouie and of Joseph, both witnesses 
for respondent, rather'.-than the testimony of Rameau. _, 
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determination had been made should not be granted unless it is clear that 
the requesting party did not know, and should not reasonably be expected to 
have known, about the existence of further evidence. The proposed testimony 
of Roberts is not of such a character. The final day for the presentation 
of evidence to the hearing officer was June 14, 1977, a week after Rameau 
was notified of his promotion and while the hearing was still open. The 
affidavit was not submitted until November 2, 1977. In any event, the allega-
tions in the affidavit could not affect the outcome of the proceeding, as they 
would not establish that the grievance was submitted in the first instance to 
the superior body for prosecution. 
In support of its contention that the hearing officer's reliance 
upon the testimony of Rameau should be reversed, respondent argues that, as 
a matter of law, Rameau's testimony about the grievance cannot be believed 
because on other issues the hearing officer credited the testimony of 
witnesses who contradicted the testimony of Rameau. We do not agree. The 
hearing officer evaluated the testimony of the witnesses on each point. 
That his resolution of credibility questions followed no unvarying automatic 
pattern, is an indication that he considered the demeanor of the witnesses 
and other relevant factors in a discriminating manner, rather than adopting 
a general inflexible standard, as respondent would wish us to do. We affirm 
the hearing officer's findings of fact and conclusions of law and determine 
that respondent violated §209-a.2(a) of the Taylor Law in that it refused 
to consider or process a grievance submitted by Serge B. Rameau on February 15, 
L977, and refused to explain its reasons for doing so. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that Social Service Employees Union, Local 
371, cease and desist from refusing to 
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represent Serge B. Rameau fairly and 
impartially and from refusing to evaluate 
his grievances and explaining to him its 
failure to process any grievance properly 
submitted by him. 
DATED: New York, New York 
January 23, 1978 
Josepii R. Crowley 
csfaa, &%Lu*. 
Ida Klaus 
